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Off-the-Bench Restrictions on Judges:
Ambiguity in Search of an Answer
Honorable Philip B. Benefiel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Activities which for most citizens are legal and even commendable can lead to disciplinary proceedings against Illinois judges.
The purpose of this Article is not to complain that judges are
treated by rules of conduct as "second class citizens" ' or that they
should be entitled to enjoy all the privileges enjoyed by non-judicial
citizens.2 Rather, this Article will focus on ways to remedy the
ambiguities in the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct (the "Code") 3
regarding restrictions placed on off-the-bench judicial conduct. As
a means of highlighting these ambiguities, the Article will consider
some interpretational difficulties in the Code regarding the political
activities of judges.
In 1987, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a new code governing judicial conduct, which provides the exclusive basis for disciplining Illinois judges.4 The Judicial Inquiry Board,5 which
investigates and files complaints against judges, and the Illinois
* Judge, Circuit Court of Illinois, 2d Judicial Circuit; J.D., 1949, University of Illinois. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Kristen E. Hazel, judicial clerk
to Illinois Appellate Court Justice Daniel J. McNamara, for her research and editing
assistance throughout this Article.
1. See Doherty, Judges Are Not Second Class Citizens, 62 ILL. B.J. 274 (1974); see
also Greenberg, Judges Are First Class Citizens and a Great Deal More, 62 ILL. B.J. 378
(1974).
2. ILL. S. CT. R. 62, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 62 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989)
(committee commentary). The committee commentary to canon 2 of the Illinois Code of
Judicial Conduct provides: "A judge must ... accept restrictions on his conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly." Id.
3. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 61-76, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, paras. 61-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989). The Code is the product of many years of work and study by the Illinois Supreme
Court. Id. (background). The committee to study the Code initially was appointed in
1979. Id. (background). The Code is based on the 1972 American Bar Association Code
of Judicial Ethics, and is the final product of committee proposals, comments from the
bench, the bar and the public, and supreme court recommendations. Id. (background).
4. Id.; People ex. rel. Harrod v. Illinois Cts. Comm'n, 69 I11.
2d 445, 470, 372 N.E.2d
53, 64 (1977).
5. The Judicial Inquiry Board investigates complaints against judges. ILL. CONST.
art. VI, § 15(b)-(d).
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Courts Commission, 6 which hears those complaints, base their decisions on the Code. 7 Based largely on the 1972 American Bar
Association Code of Judicial Ethics,' the new Code is modified to
accommodate the Illinois judicial system. 9 The rules encompass
several foundational principles such as independence, avoidance of
areas such as offimpropriety, and impartiality,' 0 as well as other
2
the-bench activity" and financial disclosure.'
Taken together, the rules provide an ostensibly fair and explicit
designation of the parameters of ethical conduct. Nonetheless, the
rules, perhaps of necessity, are drafted such that their proper interpretation is not always clear. May a judge chair a committee organized to promote civic improvement in the judge's community?
May the judge attend a political function if the judge does not
speak or actively participate? May the judge and his or her spouse
participate in social activities with friends in the local bar association? At a recent Illinois Judicial Conference, judges differed
widely on their responses to such questions.
This Article will suggest that some ambiguities in the Code need
to be resolved by amendments to the rules.' 3 Also, this Article will
recommend the creation of an advisory board to issue advisory
opinions interpreting the Code. Judges need to know if their opinion of the Code will conform with the interpretation of the Judicial
Inquiry Board and the Courts Commission. Few judges want to
endure the uncertainty and expense of a test case, even if their interpretation of the Code ultimately prevails. While advisory opinions may not be binding in disciplinary proceedings, they would
reduce the risk that the judge following such an opinion would be
regarded as acting in bad faith. I4
This Article will use the following hypothetical, originally
6. The Courts Commission hears complaints filed by the Judicial Inquiry Board. Id.
§ 15(e).
7. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 61-71, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, paras. 61-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989) (background).
8. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1988).
9. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 61-76, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, paras. 61-67 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989). The new Code replaces the rules governing judicial conduct in Illinois since 1970.
See id. (background).
10. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 61-63, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, paras. 61-63 (1987).
ILL. S. CT. Rs. 64-65, 67, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, paras. 64-65, 67 (1987).
11.
12. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 66, 68, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, paras. 66, 68 (1987).
13. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility is considering a comprehensive revision of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct. The Committee
plans to submit a revised code to the ABA House of Delegates in February 1990.
14. See Jordan, Ethics Questions Deserve an Answer, 76 ILL. B.J. 318 (1988).
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presented at the September 1988 Judicial Conference, as a point of
reference throughout the discussion:
Judge Pro's small, rural county is in serious economic trouble
with a double digit unemployment rate, businesses closing, and
property values sinking. The State Department of Corrections is
considering the county as the site for a new prison. Many people
in the county see the hundreds of jobs to be created by the prison
construction and operation as the answer to their economic woes.
They have organized a committee to promote locating the prison
in their county and have selected Judge Pro as their chairman
and spokesperson.
But other citizens vehemently oppose having the prison in
their community. It is a highly controversial issue.
II.

THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF OFF-THE-BENCH CONDUCT

The foregoing hypothetical engenders many questions. Does
Judge Pro violate any ethical rules by heading the committee seeking the prison? Can he allow his name to be used on the committee's letterhead and brochures soliciting funds for the prison effort?
Can Judge Pro make public speeches urging support for the effort?
The judges attending the ethics session viewed a video tape of
Judge Pro 5 giving a public speech supporting the prison site. In
the video enactment, a lawyer in the audience spoke up in opposition to the prison and accused the judge of violating the Code by
engaging in political activity and by allowing his name to be used
on the committee's letterhead and brochures which solicited funds
for the prison effort.
The lawyer's charge that the judge violated the Code by allowing
his name to be used for fund raising easily can be resolved. If the
judge permitted his name to be used on letterheads of letters soliciting funds for the prison effort or on brochures which solicited
donations, he clearly has violated canon 5B.16 That canon
provides:
A judge may serve as an officer, director, trustee, or nonlegal advisor of an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic
organization not conducted for the economic or political advantage of its members, subject to the following limitations:
(2) A judge should not solicit or permit his name to be used in
15. Judge Pro was portrayed in the video dramatization by Judge John Sype of Rockford, Illinois. The lawyer opposing the prison was portrayed by Judge Marion W. Garnett of Chicago, Illinois.
16. ILL. S. CT. R. 65B, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 65B (1987).
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any manner to solicit funds or other assistance for any such organization. He should not allow his name to appear in the letterhead of any such organization where the stationery is used to
solicit funds ....

7

In the dramatization, Judge Pro responded to the accusation by
indicating that he had ordered the use of his name for solicitation
purposes stopped. If his name had been used without his knowledge or approval, this might be a defense to disciplinary action,
particularly if he acted diligently to stop the practice when he became aware of it. Nonetheless, as chairman of the organization, it
is difficult to see how such fund raising efforts could have been
launched without his knowledge. His responsibility might be a
question of fact which the Judicial Inquiry Board, and possibly the
Courts Commission, would have to resolve.
Much more difficult to resolve is the issue of whether the judge
may accept a chairmanship of this controversial organization and
speak publicly regarding its goals. This issue turns on the definition of the term "political activity" within the context of canon 7
of the Code. 8 Canon 7A of the Code provides in pertinent part:
(2) A judge may not, except when a candidate for office or retention, participate in political campaigns or activities, or make
political contributions.
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system,
or the administration of justice. 9
In the scenario, the lawyer opposing the prison accuses the judge
of violating the judicial canon on political activity.2 ° Ordinarily,
participation in a campaign to locate a prison in the county would
not be "political" in nature, and might even be considered an activity "concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of
justice."' 2 ' Judges expressly are permitted to serve as members, ofto those purposes, and
ficers, or directors of organizations devoted
22
topics.
those
about
to speak publicly
Whether the prison issue is a political matter might depend on
other facts. In the hypothetical, the lawyer opposing the prison
17.

Id.

18.

ILL. S. CT. R. 67A(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 67A(4) (1987).
ILL. S. CT. R. 67A, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 67A (1987) (emphasis

19.
added).
20.
21.
22.

Id.
ILL. S. CT. R. 64A, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 64A (1987).
ILL. S. CT. R. 64C, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 64C (1987).
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asserts that securing the prison site is a part of the local Republican
Party's platform, and that Judge Pro would be a candidate of the
Republican Party in the next election. Given these facts, it appears
that the cause which Judge Pro supported is a partisan, political
cause. Thus, his involvement violates the Code, unless it can be
the law, the
justified as being "on behalf of measures to improve
23
legal system, or the administration of justice.
Is locating a prison within a certain county a measure "to improve the administration of justice"? In JudicialInquiry Commission v. McGraw,2 4 the West Virginia Supreme Court found that a
judge's public debate over the budgetary needs of the court did not
25
violate Code provisions pertaining to off-the-bench conduct.
Moreover, in In re Staples,2 6 the Washington Supreme Court found
that a judge did not act improperly in circulating petitions, making
campaign speeches, organizing a committee and running newspaper advertisements advocating a state constitutional amendment to
avoid the transfer of superior court sessions from one town to another. 27 The court stated that the policy reasons behind the general prohibition of judges' participation in political activities were
inapplicable to the situation under their review. 28 The court noted
that it had not been alleged that Judge Staples' political activities
were so extensive as to impair his primary judicial obligations.2 9
Nonetheless, the budgetary needs of the court or a constitutional
amendment relating to the structure of the court arguably are less
political in nature than the location of a prison as each involves the
day-to-day functioning of the administration of justice. Thus,
although the West Virginia and Washington cases provide some
insight into the question of where the boundaries are to be drawn,
they are not dispositive of the issue raised in the hypothetical.
The judge's adversary in the video asserts that the judge will be a
candidate in the next election. If the judge is a candidate, his political activity might be approved under canon 7(A)(2), which provides that "[a] judge may not, except when a candidatefor office or
,30
retention, participate in political campaigns or activities ....
I10A, para. 67A(4) (1987).
299 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1983).
Id. at 875. See also Shaman & Reiter, PoliticalActivities of Judges, 8 JUD. CONDUCT REP. 56 (1986).
26. 105 Wash. 2d 905, 719 P.2d 558 (1986).
27. Id. at 911-12, 719 P.2d at 562.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 910, 719 P.2d at 561.
30. ILL. S. CT. R. 67A(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 67A(2) (1987) (emphasis
added).
23.

24.
25.

ILL. S. CT. R. 67A(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
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This provision raises one of the most troubling questions under the
new Code: When does a person become a candidate? Is it when he
files his petition, or when he announces his candidacy, or perhaps
the day after he is elected or retained and begins to make plans for
3
retention at the end of his six-year term? '
Thus far, no clear answer has emerged in Illinois. It is unrealistic to expect a judicial candidate to wait until he files his petition or
notice of seeking retention to begin the political activity necessary
for election or retention. In most cases, some fund raising and organizing must precede the filing date. Yet if one is always a candidate from the day he takes office, as some successful politicians
maintain, the Code is meaningless in proscribing political activities
for a judge who is not a candidate. A judge who has been appointed to a judicial office for which he must now seek election,
and a judge seeking higher judicial office or retention must know at
what time he becomes a candidate, otherwise he risks either disciplinary action for participating in a political campaign before he is
a candidate or defeat for not starting his campaign soon enough.
Not only is it unclear precisely when a judge becomes a candidate, but it is also unclear what is a political activity which a judge
must avoid.3" Moreover, it is unclear what actions are encompassed by the words "participate in" and "engage in" for purposes
of canon 7.33 Does mere attendance at a political function constitute "participating in" or "engaging in" a political activity, as proscribed by canon 7? Does a judge participate or engage in political
activity even though he merely sits in the back of the room, does
31. The rules governing Maryland judges eliminate this dilemma by outlining the
status of a judge as a candidate. Canon 5C provides as follows:
A newly appointed judge is a 'candidate' for judicial office from the date of
taking office until the general election pertaining to that judge's election or initial retention. Any other incumbent judge is a 'candidate' for a period commencing two years prior to the general election pertaining to that judge's reelection or subsequent retention, or when a newly appointed judge to that court
becomes a 'candidate' in the same general election, whichever first occurs. A
judge who is seeking election to another judicial office is a 'candidate' for that
office when the judge files a certificate of candidacy in accordance with the state
election laws, but no earlier than two years prior to the general election for that
office, or when a newly appointed judge to that court becomes a 'candidate' in
the same general election, whichever first occurs.
MD. RULES, MD. CODE ANN., Rule 1231, Canon 5C (1988).

32. For a general discussion regarding the uncertainty of judges in interpreting various aspects of the canon on political activities, see Volcansek, Code of JudicialEthics: Do
They Affect Judges' Views of ProperOff-The-Bench Behavior?, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 493, 496-

99 (1980).
33. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 67A(2), 67A(4), ILL.
(1987).

REV. STAT.

ch. I 10A, para. 67A(2), 67A(4)

1989]

Off-the-Bench Restrictions on Judges

not make a4 speech or sit at the speaker's table, and is not
introduced?
The ABA Model Code35 from which the Illinois rule is derived
provides:
A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as permitted by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such
gatherings on his own behalf when he is a candidate for election
or re-election, identify himself as a member of a political party,
and contribute to a political party or organization.36
The Illinois Supreme Court, by deleting the word "attend" from
its canon 7, seemed to indicate an intent not to prohibit a judge's
attendance at political events, provided the judge does not actively
participate. Nonetheless, the Committee Comments to the Code
make no specific reference to the omission and, accordingly, the
committee's intent is uncertain.37
Although the determination of when a judge becomes a candidate is difficult, it is clear that when a judge is a candidate for
judicial election or retention, the restrictions on his political activities are substantial. A candidate for judicial office, like an incumbent judge, is required to maintain the dignity appropriate to the
judicial office. 3' He may not make pledges or promises of conduct
in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the
duties of the office. 39 Moreover, he may not "announce his views
on disputed legal or political issues. ' ' 4
In the hypothetical, if Judge Pro is a candidate, he would violate
the latter provision by speaking in favor of the prison because the
prison issue is a disputed legal or political issue. If Judge Pro is a
34. Some commentators have expressed the view that mere attendance at such an
event is participating in a political activity in violation of the rule. On the other hand,
some judges such as Judge David Shields of Cook County and Justice Tobias Barry of the
Appellate Court for the Third District argue that attendance alone should not be considered a violation of the Code, and their reasoning would seem to find support in wellestablished rules of construction.
35.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1988).

36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(2) (1988) (emphasis added). In
contrast, the analogous Illinois canon provides that "[a] judge may not, except when a
candidate for office or retention, participate in political campaigns or activities, or make
political contributions." ILL. S. CT. R. 67A(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 67A(2)
(1987).
37. See generally ILL. S. CT. R. 67, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 67 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989) (committee commentary & supplement to historical and practice notes).
38. ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(l)(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 67B(l)(a) (1987).
39. ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(1)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 67B(1)(c) (1987).
40. Id.
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non-candidate, however, speaking in favor of building a prison in
the judge's county may be an activity concerning the administration of justice as authorized in canon 4A.4 ' Canon 4A provides
that a non-candidate judge may "speak, write, lecture, teach, and
participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system,
and the administration of justice. ' 42 Such activities are subject to
the requirement that the judge maintain the proper performance of
his judicial duties. The judge's activities must not cast doubt on
his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before
him.43 The determination of what activities cast doubt on a
judge's capacity to decide issues impartially is subjective.
In a system in which judges are elected, it would be prudent to
advise both the judiciary and the public where the lines are to be
drawn, and thereby to remove as much subjectivity as possible.
Campaigning judges often are confronted with situations in which
the Code would seem to limit their conduct, but in which political
realities would seem to demand that very conduct. For example,
the proscription in rule 67B(l)(c) that a judicial candidate should
not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of office, and
should not announce his views on disputed legal or political issues, 4 raised a number of dilemmas for judges attending the September 1988 Judicial Conference. Many of those judges were
candidates in the 1988 election and had been questioned by special
interest groups seeking to know the candidates' views on various
issues such as abortion, gun control, the death penalty, and other
issues which were raised in the 1988 presidential campaign. Some
judges had been interviewed, and many had received questionnaires warning that if the candidate failed to state his views on the
issue of concern to the group, it would be assumed he opposed the
special interest group's views. This approach poses a considerable
threat to a candidate. Clearly, the rule prohibits a judge from stating his personal views on the subjects mentioned above. Can the
judge, however, state a view on less controversial issues? Or, can
the judge speak in general about legal principles such as stare decisis which would dictate his resolution of those issues?
A judge's failure to answer specific questions may be publicized
to hundreds of voters in his district who are committed to electing
41.
42.
43.
44.

ILL. S. CT. R. 64A, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 64A (1987).
Id.
ILL. S. CT. R. 64, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 64 (1987).
ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(l)(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1OA, para. 67B(1)(c) (1987).
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persons who share their views.4" The only help the panel at the
Judicial Conference could give these candidates is that they must,
of course, adhere to the judicial canons and advise the voters of
their duty to do so.
Although the Judicial Conference panel's advice is useful, it assumes that judges know how to adhere to the judicial canons. As
noted above, in some cases the proper path to be taken by a judge
is clear. In other cases, however, interpretational difficulties make
unclear a judge's determination of whether he can answer a question, attend a meeting, or make a speech. The judge's determina45. This points up a very real possibility that the Code could be instrumental in electing the demagogic candidate in a judicial election and in defeating his more scrupulous
opponent. The following example highlights this problem.
Judge A holds office by appointment to fill a vacancy in a downstate county or circuit.
Under Illinois law, to retain his judicial office, he must run in the next general election,
which is a partisan, contested election. As a practical matter, Judge A must run as a
Democrat or Republican, and will be opposed by Lawyer B, the candidate of the opposite
party.
The county or circuit where Judge A must run has a significant number of National
Rifle Association ("NRA") members, as well as other citizens who strongly oppose any
legislative or judicial action to restrict the right to purchase and own guns. There is also
a local organization, Citizens Opposing Gun Seizure ("COGS"), which lobbies against
gun control legislation. The organization has sent questionnaires to legislative and judicial candidates in the area asking their views on gun control.
Judge A properly informs COGS that he is prohibited by the Judicial Code from announcing his views on disputed legal or political issues. See ILL. S. CT. R. 67B(l)(c), ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 67B(l)(c) (1987). Lawyer B, as a candidate for judicial
office, also is bound by the same code provisions. Id. Lawyer B, however, may not be
aware of the restriction. As a successful trial lawyer and pragmatic politician, he is
acutely aware of the political repercussions his response may have. He replies: "My firm
stand in favor of the guarantees of the Second Amendment is well known. I have made
many speeches and supported every effort to preserve the rights of citizens to keep and
bear arms. I would hold any laws or ordinances denying those rights to be unconstitutional."
Lawyer B's statement and Judge A's refusal to comment are published to the membership of the organization and are made known to other voters who oppose gun control
legislation. It may be that only 20% of the people in the county or circuit feel strongly
opposed to gun control legislation, and possibly a majority would favor some restrictions
on gun ownership. Nonetheless, the 80% not opposed likely will not vote as a block, and
may vote along party lines or for the judicial candidate they consider better qualified.
Assume that the 80% of those not strongly opposed to gun control are divided 60% for
Judge A and 40% for Lawyer B. Thus, Lawyer B receives 32% of the total vote from the
non-gun oriented voters and additionally the vote of the 20% who will vote for him
because of his stand on guns. Thus, Lawyer B receives 52% of the vote, and Judge A
receives 48%. Lawyer B wins the election, largely on the gun control issue.
If Judge A had responded to the gun control issue as Lawyer B did, he would be
subject to discipline because he was a judge at the time of the election. Lawyer B, however, is not subject to judicial discipline because although he violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct, he did so before he was elected a judge. See In re Kaye, 1111. Cts. Comm'n 36,
50 (1974) (noting the Commission's lack of authority to proceed against a party for conduct occurring before that party became a member of the judiciary).
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tion nevertheless is crucial because the disciplinary repercussions
of an incorrect determination are enormous.46
III.

PROPOSAL

The vast grey areas that exist under the new Code have led to a
call from judges for an agency to render advisory opinions on judicial ethics. 47 To date, the Illinois Supreme Court has neither sanctioned nor disallowed the formation of an entity designed to issue
advisory opinions to judges. The Illinois Judges Association has
begun exploratory meetings with delegates of the Illinois State Bar
Association and Chicago Bar Association to create an agency to
render opinions to judges on ethical issues.48
When the committee studying the Illinois Code chose to adopt
the ABA canons as the foundation for the Code, it predicated its
decision on two interrelated considerations: the desire for uniformity in judicial codes of conduct and the need for a body of
interpretive decisions to provide direction in determining the
proper application of the rules.4 9 With regard to the latter consideration, the committee noted that the ABA had established a
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
which renders opinions pertaining to professional and judicial conduct. 50 Obviously, these opinions only provide guidance in Illinois
for those situations in which the Illinois Code and the ABA Code
contain the same language. 5 For those situations in which the two
codes differ,52 however, the ABA opinions cannot lend any guidance to the Illinois judiciary.
The Illinois judiciary can look to the opinions issued by the
46. See ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15(e) (setting forth the disciplinary actions which the
Illinois Courts Commission may take upon a finding of judicial misconduct).
47. See Chicago Daily L. Bull., Sept. 8, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (judges and lawyers call
for appointment of committee to issue advisory opinions). See also Jordan, Ethics Questions Deserve an Answer, 76 ILL. B.J. 318 (1988).
48. Justice Rosemary Duschene LaPorta of the First District Appellate Court reported to the Board of Directors meeting of the Illinois Judges Association on June 16,
1989, that representatives of the three organizations have proposed an agency to render
judicial ethics opinions for judges, the agency tentatively proposed to consist of twelve
members, six to be judges and six to be lawyers. Many details remain to be worked out.
49. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 61-68, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, paras. 61-68 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989) (committee commentary).
50. Id. See T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, 1988 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 429-31 (1988).
51. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1988) with ILL. S. CT.
R. 62, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 62 (1987)..
52. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(2) (1988) with ILL. S.
CT. R. 67A(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 67A(2) (1987).
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Committee on Professional Ethics of the Illinois State Bar Association (hereinafter "ISBA Committee"). 3 These opinions are published in the ILLINOIS BAR JOURNAL, and provide useful guidance
to lawyers and judges. 4 Nonetheless, neither the supreme court
nor the legislature has sanctioned the ISBA Committee, and accordingly, any opinions rendered by that entity summarily can be
rejected by the Judicial Inquiry Board and the Courts Commission.
If, however, the ISBA Committee, or some other newly created
entity, were officially recognized and authorized to issue advisory
opinions, the Illinois judiciary would have concrete guidance as to
whether contemplated actions are appropriate. 55
Several states have adopted legislation which designates such entities.5 6 These entities typically take one of two forms. The first
type of entity issues only advisory opinions. 7 The second type of
entity issues opinions which protect the judge from a charge that
he has violated that canon which was the subject of the opinion. 8
In those states which have an advisory entity, judges are permitted to seek advice regarding the propriety of certain actions without the fear of a binding decision. For example, the Alabama rules
of procedure for the Judicial Inquiry Commission provide that a
judge may request an opinion as to whether a particular action
constitutes a violation of the canons of judicial ethics.5 9 The Commission may in its discretion render a written opinion to the
judge. 6° Any such opinion then is admissible on behalf of the judge
53. See Jordan, supra note 47, at 322.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. The states which have adopted such legislation include: Alabama (Judicial Inquiry Commission), Arizona (Arizona Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee), Florida
(Committee on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges), Georgia (Judicial Qualifications Commission), Kentucky (Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary), Louisiana
(Supreme Court Committee on Judicial Ethics), Maryland (Judicial Ethics of the Maryland Judicial Conference), Michigan (State Bar of Michigan Ethics Committee), Missouri
(Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline), New Hampshire (Supreme Court
Judicial Conduct Advisory Opinions), North Dakota (Special Committee on the Judiciary), Oregon (Judicial Conduct Committee), Pennsylvania (Judicial Ethics Committee of
Conference of State Trial Judges), South Carolina (Advisory Committee on Standards of
Judicial Conduct), Tennessee (Judicial Ethics Committee), Texas (Judicial Ethics Committee of Texas), Washington (Administrator for the Courts), West Virginia (Judicial
Inquiry Commission).
57. See, e.g., ALA. CODE, Rule 17 (1984 & Supp. 1988) (Rules of Procedure of Judicial Inquiry Commission).
58. See, e.g., MD. RULES, MD. CODE ANN., Rule 1231, Canon 7 (1988) (Judicial
Ethics Committee).
59. ALA. CODE, Rule 17 (1984 & Supp. 1988) (Rules of Procedure of Judicial Inquiry
Commission).
60. Id.
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to whom it is directed in the event he or she is made the subject of
a disciplinary proceeding. 6 ' The disciplinary organization, however, is not bound by the advisory opinion of the Commission.62
The judicial ethics committee in Kentucky is granted powers
similar to those given to the Judicial Inquiry Committee in Alabama.63 In Kentucky, however, the ethics committee does not
have discretion over whether to render the opinion.' Rather, the
committee must render an opinion, but may choose between an
informal opinion, to be given only to the questioner, and a formal
opinion, to be published in complete or synopsis form.65 In either
event, the opinion is advisory in nature. The supreme court, however, must consider the judge's reliance on the ethics committee
opinion in the event that judge should become subject to disciplinary proceedings.66 Although the disciplinary entity is not bound
by the opinion of the ethics committee, a party affected by a formal
opinion of the ethics committee nonetheless may obtain review of
the opinion by the supreme court.67
In the second type of entity, the decision is binding in any disciplinary proceeding if the judge has complied with the opinion.68
Maryland has adopted this system. 69 Thus, a judicial officer may
in writing request the opinion of the Judicial Ethics Committee
regarding the proper interpretation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.7" If disciplinary proceedings later are instituted against the
judge, and he has complied with the ethics opinion, he is protected
from a charge that he violated the particular provision. 7'
Both types of ethics organizations serve a useful purpose by providing a forum for receipt of inquiries from the judiciary before any
action is taken. Moreover, both types of organizations provide
proper interpretation of the canons of ethics. The Illinois committee appointed to study and to develop the Code recognized that
61. Id.
62. Id. See Balogun v. Balogun, 516 So. 2d 606 (Ala. 1987) (explaining that the
commission's advisory opinions are not binding but are admissible on behalf of a judge
should he act consistent with the opinion and then have disciplinary proceedings brought
against him for that conduct).
63. See Ky. S. CT. R. 4.310(1), Ky. RULES ANN. (1988).
64. Ky. S. CT. R. 4.310(2), Ky. RULES ANN. (1988).
65. Id.
66. Ky. S. CT. R. 4.310(3), Ky. RULES ANN. (1988).
67. Ky. S. CT. R. 4.310(4), Ky. RULES ANN. (1988).
68. See, e.g., MD. RULES, MD. CODE ANN., Rule 1231, Canon 7 (1988) (Judicial
Ethics Committee).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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there was a need for interpretation when the proper application of
a rule is unclear.7 2 Nonetheless, to date there is no officially sanctioned organization in Illinois which provides this needed
interpretation.
The judges of Illinois should have a forum designed to guide
them in interpreting the Code. The forum could be structured to
limit its functions to the issuance of advisory opinions.7 3 Moreover, the framework of the forum could be structured to permit
issuance of an advisory opinion in response to inquiries from a
judge, or on the forum's own motion.74
The states which have created ethics committees typically have
members of the judiciary and of the state bar association sitting on
the committee.7 5 Others require that at least one member of the
committee not be a lawyer or an employee or officer within the
judicial branch of government.76 Still others require that the members of the committee not be members of the disciplinary entity in
that state.7 7
There appears to be valid reasons why it would not be desirable
or practicable for either the Judicial Inquiry Board or the Courts
Commission to render advisory opinions on judicial ethics in Illinois. Nor should ethical opinions, from whatever source, be binding on the disciplinary agencies as they are in some jurisdictions.
The duties imposed on those disciplinary agencies by the Illinois
Constitution could be compromised if either agency were bound by
an advisory opinion issued by the agency itself or any other agency.
This would not in any way preclude those disciplinary bodies
from considering the fact that a judge whose conduct is called into
question acted with diligence and good faith in securing and following the advisory opinion. Surely, such diligence and good faith
would be strong evidence to dispel charges of "wilful misconduct
78
in office."
72. ILL. S. CT. Rs. 61-68, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, paras. 61-68 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989) (committee commentary).
73. See, e.g., 8 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. Appendix "C" (West Supp. 1989) (Committee
on Judicial Ethics).
74. See id. See also Ky. S. CT. R. 4.310(2), Ky. RULES ANN. (1988).
75. See, e.g., Ky. S. CT. R. 4.310(1), Ky. RULES ANN. (1988); 8 LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. Appendix "C" (West Supp. 1989) (Committee on Judicial Ethics); MD. RULES,
MD. CODE ANN., Rule 1231, Canon 7 (1988) (Judicial Ethics Committee).
76. See MD. RULES, MD. CODE ANN., Rule 1231, Canon 7 (1988) (Judicial Ethics
Committee).
77. See, e.g., Ky. S. CT. R. 4.310(1), Ky. RULES ANN. (1988).
78. The Illinois Constitution gives the Judicial Inquiry Board authority to file complaints charging a judge with "wilful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform
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IV. CONCLUSION
In light of today's heightened awareness of judicial conduct 7 9 it
is not unreasonable to expect judges to assume some restrictions in
their daily off-the-bench conduct not required of other citizens.
But judges should be afforded some answers to what those restrictions and limitations are, particularly where the Code of Judicial
Conduct leaves doubt and uncertainty.
Two possible remedies may afford at least partial relief in resolving the doubts and ambiguities found in the Code. One is for the
Code to be revised so as to be more explicit in defining what a
judge may and may not do ethically. While the American Bar Association considers modification in its Model Code,"' the ultimate
determination as to what changes, if any, are to be made in the
Illinois Code lies with the Illinois Supreme Court. However, committees of the Illinois Judges Association, the Illinois State Bar Association, and other bar and civic organizations should continue to
study the Code and make recommendations for revisions to resolve
the ambiguities and uncertainties of the Code.
But in some areas more explicit definition may not be practicable
or desirable. Just as jury instructions do not attempt to define
"reasonable doubt," so the Code should leave any explanation of
certain provisions and terms (such as "appearance of impropriety" 81 ) to the good judgment of those who must follow and apply
the rules.
Reasonable men and women often differ as to the interpretation
to be given a particular rule, and for a judge such differences of
opinion may have severe consequences. The expense and trauma
of defending his or her actions before the Judicial Inquiry Board or
the Courts Commission may be harsh.
The other proposed solution to resolving ambiguities in the Code
is to provide an agency to render advisory opinions.82 In Illinois, it
his duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that
brings the judicial office into disrepute" or that the judge "is physically or mentally unable to perform his duties." ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15.

79. See Jordan, supra note 47, at 318 (focusing on the ramifications of the Greylord
scandal).
80. See supra note 13.
81. "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All
His Activities." ILL. S. CT. R. 62, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 62 (1987).
82. A "Judicial Ethics Committee" to give advisory opinions on judicial conduct is
recommended for all jurisdictions by the Discussion Draft for the proposed revision of
the ABA Code, Appendix, at 71 (May 1, 1989). The appendix provides an example of
how such a committee might be established by appointment of the chief judge of the
highest court of the jurisdiction. The example also provides for such opinions to have
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does not appear that any such opinions could be binding on the
Judicial Inquiry Board or the Courts Commission. Nevertheless,
where a judge conscientiously seeks an opinion from a reliable, recognized agency created to give such opinions, and where the judge
relies on the advice given, it is reasonable to conclude that he or
she has acted with diligence and good faith. It is hoped that the
efforts of the Illinois Judges Association, the Illinois State Bar Association, and the Chicago Bar Association will soon bring forth
such an agency.

binding effect in disciplinary proceedings and for publication of opinions in edited versions so as not to disclose the identity of the person requesting the opinion and other
confidential data.

